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Climate Change Leadership Forum reports


Response to Cluster Group A Recommendations

Climate Change Leadership Forum report number: 8

Briefing for the Climate Change Leadership Forum
Prepared by the Emissions Trading Group
Date: 3 April 2008

Introduction

In November 2007, Cluster Group A of the Climate Change Leadership Forum prepared a draft document for discussion that presented their  recommendations about the treatment of “hot air” units, liquidity and volatility, government participation and facilitation, price controls, bankability and tax. 

This document sets out officials’ response to the recommendations.  Where applicable, this includes comments about what was in the Bill as submitted, progress on implementation, the process that has taken place since this paper was prepared and advice provided to Cabinet.  Many recommendations have been adopted or are not precluded by the Bill, others are in process and some have been rejected by Ministers.

A. THE UNIT

Working Group A looked at four options for the treatment of “hot air” AAUs.

Option 1: All AAUs included for all participants
Option 2: AAUs1 included but only to be bought/sold by the Government
Option 3: AAUs excluded
Option 4: AAUs excluded but with a right to review or triggers for change included.

The recommendation of Cluster A was for option 3

Hot-air AAUs should be excluded from the NZETS, but the legislation should incorporate either a “tag-along” clause that will allow hot-air AAUs into the scheme if the EU ETS does, or a right to review based on a specific test with definitions at a level of specificity higher than the usual “public interest” test.

The Climate Change Leadership Forum at its meeting on 8 November 2007 had considerable discussion around these issues but did not reach any decisions.

Developments since the November meeting

The Treasury were tasked with undertaking more detailed analysis of the price effects of either including or excluding AAUs (or intermediary options) (see briefing paper ‘Further analysis of AAUs in the ETS’2).  Furthermore officials were asked to seek the views of Australian and Japanese officials on their position in relation to “hot air” AAUs.

The Bill currently permits the importation of AAUs from other jurisdictions, including “hot air” AAUs, but retains regulatory powers under the Climate Change Response Act that would enable the government to prospectively (but not retrospectively) change this in the future.  The Bill also permits the trading of New Zealand AAUs within the NZ ETS (refer to footnote 1 for explanation).

Officials consider there are two main policy options that would support the importation of AAUs:

  1. Leave the Bill as it stands and undertake a regular review; or
  2. Allow NZ ETS participants to surrender for compliance AAUs imported only from specific jurisdictions through bilateral agreement.  (This could potentially, but not necessarily, include “hot air” AAUs associated with “green investment schemes.”  It could also include AAUs imported through bilateral linkage agreements with, for example, the EU ETS). 

A third option could be applied alongside either of those options:

  1. Prohibit the carry-over (banking) of imported AAUs by NZ ETS participants between commitment periods.

The third option would essentially enable NZ ETS participants to purchase and surrender imported AAUs to meet their obligations through 2012, but not to bank surplus imported AAUs across commitment periods to use for future compliance.  This approach potentially could (but would not be guaranteed to) facilitate bilateral linking post-2012 between the NZ ETS and other schemes, such as the EU ETS, that would not accept trading in imported AAUs.

Officials request that the Forum gives further consideration to these three options.

B. LIQUIDITY AND VOLATILITY

The working group considered the drivers affecting liquidity and volatility and ways in which they could be managed.  These include information provided to the market, participants and regulation, the futures market and the connectivity with the registry.  Officials are continuing to give consideration to the impact on liquidity and volatility at a practical level as the requirements for implementation are developed.  Officials’ responses are set out briefly under each of the Cluster A’s recommendations in the table below.

Liquidity Drivers – Fundamental Information

Cluster A Recommendations

Responses

 

  1. All emitters with a point of obligation under the ETS should be required to provide to the market compliance (demand and supply positions) information on a quarterly basis.

 

Officials believe that providing information on a quarterly basis may not have a significant impact as prices will be set internationally and New Zealand will be a price taker.

At a practical level, it would be difficult to apply meaningfully to all sectors, especially forestry, and would impose additional compliance costs on participants.

  1. Audited information need only be released on an annual basis.

 

The current model proposed in the Bill is one of self-assessment in a similar manner to GST and income tax provisions where the onus is on the individual to provide accurate information.  There is currently no general requirement for emissions return information to be audited prior to submission. Once this information is received by the regulator, there will be some level of general verification based on risk factors, but this will not constitute an audit.

However, the Bill permits regulations being made requiring a participant to have a verifier "verify" their data and/or their return prior to submission.  Similarly, after the emissions return information is received, the Chief Executive may elect to conduct an investigation to check the information. This would not be more frequent than annually.

  1. Each entity can meet any government annual reporting compliance requirements off audited or non-audited information, thus ensuring that each entity can tie their carbon audit into their annual financial audit process.

 

(a) There is no requirement in the Bill for emissions returns to be based on audited information.  However, entitlements and liabilities for NZUs included in participants’ balance sheets would be subject to their own external audit where required.  This will add a level of confidence about the completeness and accuracy of information provided.

(b) If different emissions return cycles were allowed based on organisations balance dates, it would be extremely difficult to get a view of the emissions for a common period. Given that Kyoto reporting requirements follow an annual reporting cycle, having New Zealand participants’ emissions being reported on a differing cycle could present NZU and Kyoto reporting challenges.   However, the Registry system is being designed to accommodate differing annual emissions returns cycles should this be a requirement in future.

  1. All entities should be required to release their information to government and the broader market via an accredited information provider that can ensure that such information is available globally on a real-time basis. This is important to reduce search costs for global players (i.e., they have it delivered to them, rather than having to search a specific New Zealand database or access it by request).

 

Officials assume this recommendation refers to compliance information provided to government (noting there is no requirement for third party audit).  The Emissions Unit Register will only record the number of emissions units transferred, not the unit price.

The Bill already provides for significant information to be accessible and searchable under sections 18, 26, 27, 28 and 79.  These sections provide, amongst other things, for total (aggregated) information to be available about the total quantities of units held at the beginning of a calendar year, total units issued, total units transferred to other registries, and total units cancelled, surrendered, and converted, etc during the year.  They also provide for the publishing in relation to each activity of the total number of participants, total number and type of activities, number and type of units surrendered, total NZUs transferred for removal activities, allocated free of charge and sold by public tender.

Any trading provider or platform would have easy access to this information.

However, at a practical compliance level, compliance information received and disseminated to the market (including government) via approved information providers would be analogous to Inland Revenue receiving information on corporate taxpayers’ obligations via quarterly release of financial results to an entity such as the stock exchange or an information service.  This compliance information is required for meeting statutory obligations which generally generate a liability for the entity and it would not be appropriate for that information to be provided to government through public channels.

Liquidity Drivers – Transaction and Market Information

Cluster A contend that access to price and volume information is fundamental to liquidity and that legislation should require post trade transparency for spot market transactions in NZUs, as this would provide a “last price” signal to the overall market.  Any buyer or seller can see where the market is at and make an informed decision as to whether to transact or to change their strategy.  This would ensure that (a) rorts do not occur, such as where two people are offered the same number of NZUs at wildly different prices by the same player at the same point in time, and (b) there is an overall picture of market price at particular volumes allowing market participants to execute informed transactional and risk management strategies with the lowest search costs acheivable.

Cluster A Recommendations

Responses

  1. The legislation should require that all trades in NZUs by (or on behalf of) entities with an NZETS compliance obligation, or by financial intermediaries regulated in New Zealand, be reported to an accredited market information provider.
  2. The specific information reported should comprise the volume traded and the price per unit traded. This information should not be bundled (e.g., if an entity trades 20 tonnes at $20 per tonne, and 10 tonnes at $18 per tonne, each of those trades should be reported separately, as to bundle them would not allow a true market supply and demand curve to be constructed, or to track price movements (e.g., 30 tonnes at $19.30 is a very different information set).
  3. This post-trade information should be required to be reported immediately to the information provider.
  4. To ensure the authenticity of price and volume information released to the market, accredited information providers should receive, but not release, information as to the identity of the entities transacting.
  5. The requirements to become an accredited market information provider should be managed in regulation not legislation.

It is important for the market to have reliable, timely information available to it regarding price and volumes of trades by participants.  However, officials question whether the reporting of all trades would improve liquidity when additional liquidity is provided through international transactions.  The design of the NZ ETS deliberately enables international trade because of the low volumes and liquidity risks within such a small market.  As such, New Zealand will be a price taker and market participants will have access to international price and volume information.

Trading intermediaries could voluntarily provide information to the market about the aggregated volumes and prices of trades they have facilitated.

There are some markets overseas that have such reporting requirements e.g. the Corporate and Municipal bond market in the US is required to report transaction information to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (formerly known as NASD (National Association of Security Dealers)) within 15 minutes of a trade.

Careful consideration would need to be given to:

  • the type of entity that could be an accredited information provider to avoid potential conflicts of interest arising from any other commercial activities an information provider may be involved in, particularly given the commercial sensitivity of the information they would be collecting;
  • the need for additional regulation and monitoring of the information provider(s);
  • additional compliance and cost burden on Participants;
  • a de minimis threshold where transactions under this threshold were not required to be reported, thereby reducing compliance costs for smaller Participants, particularly the potentially large number of smaller forestry players who are Participants in the NZ ETS; and
  • concerns by potential NZ ETS Participants that requirements for disclosure of transaction and account holder information within the register are already too broad.

Given these considerations, officials would like to better understand the mechanics, including compliance measures, of how post trade information would be provided and whether this would allow private individuals to undertake direct bilateral agreements or require all trades to be transacted through a trading platform.

Officals are also concerned that, if such a requirement was introduced, it could have broader implications for other financial markets and, in light of this, would need to be considered in the context of broader financial markets, rather than just emissions trading.   As such, this would need wider work which is outside the scope of the Bill.

Participants and Regulation

Cluster A argue that the number of market participants, and the diversity of strategies they employ, are two of the most important factors in determining the overall level of liquidity.  They note that those traders that trade on short term news and short term changes in price are liquidity providers and that attracting these players is essential as their participation ensures liquidity3.  The report goes on to say that steps should be taken to ensure that no marginal cost of New Zealand regulation is imposed on those who are already supervised by reputable regulators, to encourage institutions from overseas to be continuously in our market on both the demand and the supply side. It is the case that, right now, the global players are sufficiently interested in the New Zealand market, that if this is got right, we could very likely surprise some of the “New Zealand is too small” sceptics with the vibrancy of the market.

Cluster A Recommendations

Responses

  1. The regulatory approach for anyone who wants to trade on licensed markets (as opposed to OTC), or participate directly in any part of the market infrastructure (e.g., exchange platforms, clearing houses, registry), should be based on the European “passport” model.  Under this approach, if a participant is approved in their home market to undertake certain activities, they should be allowed to undertake identical activities in New Zealand on the basis of being supervised by their home regulator – thus eliminating any duplicative compliance requirements.
  2. The New Zealand Government should actively encourage participation in the New Zealand market by seeking mutual recognition for this market and its infrastructure overseas.

Currently, for an overseas entity to have an account in the New Zealand Emissions Unit Register, they must be registered with the Companies Office as an Overseas Company.

The European Passport model currently works across the EC because there is:

  • No trading of EUA’s outside of the EC
  • Other legislation covering issues such as anti money laundering and combating terrorist financing.

This will not be the case for New Zealand, but consideration is currently being given to allowing Australian companies’ direct access as there is already joint Companies Office filing between New Zealand and Australia.  The Bill does not preclude bilateral agreements with other countries to enable direct access in the future, which would be facilitated through an amendment to the Unit Register Regulations.

Officials would like to better understand further options for models where overseas entities are able to participate in organised exchanges as licensed brokers, etc, with the proviso that this potentially has far broader implications than just emissions trading exchanges and therefore would need to be considered in this broader context.  As such, this would need wider work which is outside the scope of the Bill.

Futures Market

Cluster A Recommendations

Responses

The development of a futures market is important, and regulation should support the development of a futures market in NZUs in New Zealand.

Further work is being undertaken by the Ministry of Economic Development and provisions have been included in the draft Emissions Units Settlement Systems and Futures Bill released for consultation on 11 February 2008.

Registry

Cluster A Recommendations

Responses

  1. An electronic interface from the New Zealand Government Registry should be provided to other systems, such as those operated by participants, banks, exchanges, clearing houses, depositories and other financial institutions, using the international standard messaging protocol (the SWIFT standard 15022) and/or Web services (such as that used to communicate with ITL).

 

Discussions with TZ1 in the last two months indicate a solution which effectively allows them to offer DvP4 without an elaborate interface with the register.

However, we are exploring further the possibility of allowing a business-to-business (B2B) type interface which will allow bulk transactions to be transacted with the Registry by a party.  

Given the low volume of units expected to be in the market on 1 July, this functionality will not be available from this date, but will more likely be available in early 2009.

  1. Internal registry functionality that supports DvP should be provided. As mentioned above, DvP is now a standard in the settlement of other financial and commodity products and will become a standard in the compliance market (a proxy for DvP has been developed in the European ETS). DvP can be offered for both transactions that take place on an exchange or that take place OTC.

 

Officials are currently investigating what is provided in European registries.

A cost/benefit analysis will need to be considered for each option.

  1. The New Zealand Government enables offshore entities to establish accounts in the New Zealand Kyoto Registry with a view to enabling primary CER issuance into the New Zealand register and therefore the New Zealand and broader Asian market.

See comments on account opening by overseas organisations above.

The Ministry for the Environment are currently working on procedures for issuing Letters of Approval. These are expected to be completed in the second quarter of 2008.

C. GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION AND FACILITATION (to improve liquidity)

The Working Group has considered potential interventions in the market for NZUs, with the intention of either improving liquidity or managing price levels and, in particular, purchasing additional Kyoto Units on the international market and releasing those onto the New Zealand market.

The Working Group sees the government being able to influence liquidity through the size of the float and the availability and turnover of the float itself.  It has determined four options available to the government:

  1. Lending – making available the stock of government units in its Kyoto register to the market via lending agreements with financial intermediaries;
  2. Seeding carbon trading funds – similar in concept to the government’s VIF and GIF funds for venture capital;
  3. Establish a market operation function – involving tendering, e.g. by way of auction;
  4. Supplying new credits to the market – increasing the available float of NZUs in the New Zealand market.

Cluster A Recommendations

Response

  1. The Government should enter standard lending arrangements for certain quantities of its Kyoto bank. The Government should work with the private sector to ensure the right institutions are made aware of this facility. The Crown should also outsource the management of the actual lending arrangements. Due to tax reform undertaken last year, such lending will not be a taxable event for the entity that manages such lending on the Crown's behalf.
  2. The Government should assess developing framework which would seed carbon funds, thus increasing both float of NZUs in the market and their turnover. This should be a short-term priority.
  3. If the Government deems liquidity provision in the public interest and it believes it is best placed to source Kyoto credits, if it acts in the market, it should do so as a normal market participant, through normal channels. This will have a second order effect of facilitating the development of effective intermediaries.
  4. The Government should not run an auction process.

In response, officials note that there are a range of factors to be considered in determining how best to ensure liquidity.  These include the strength and size of international markets, the development of national allocation plans, the timing of allocation of free units, availability of units locally and internationally, transaction costs and an analysis of the costs and benefits of introducing options.

Officials’ advice to date has been that improved liquidity will be best provided through access to international markets and therefore establishing lending agreements or seeding carbon funds would be unnecessary.  However, the initiatives identified by the Working Group can be considered later should additional liquidity measures be required.

The Bill provides for the government to purchase and sell into the market if this is required.

The Bill enables a tender process (clause 43, section 75).  The tender process would be used progressively as free allocation was phased out, and could be used to facilitate domestic liquidity.

D. PRICE CONTROLS

Cluster A Recommendations

Response

The Government should not implement any price controls.

Officials’ advice has been that the Government should not implement any price controls and none are provided in the Bill as introduced.

E. BANKABILITY

Cluster A Recommendations

Response

  1. NZETS units must be able to be banked through the 2012 transition period.
  2. As the impact of any price volatility in 2012 is most likely to be hardest felt by Agriculture, work should be done on ensuring all proper risk management avenues are explored as an important priority.

The Bill places no restrictions on the banking (carry-over) of NZUs across commitment periods.   Section 16 of the Climate Change Response Act addresses the carry-over of Kyoto units across commitment periods; the Bill clarifies that this section applies to “certain Kyoto units”.

The agriculture sector is planned to enter the NZ ETS in 2013.  By this time, there will be active trading activity for other sector participants in meeting their obligations and an assessment of the extent of price volatility and risks can be made closer to this time as part of the review process.

F. TAX

Cluster A Recommendations

Response

  1. Tax treatment of carbon credits, whether NZUs or other credits held on balance sheet, should be treated in an identical manner to the tax requirements for securities such as shares.
  2. NZUs and any other carbon units should be subject to GST at the rate of zero percent.

The tax proposals on which the Working Group has commented were set out in an Inland Revenue officials' paper which was issued in September 2007.  Inland Revenue invited submissions on that paper, and submissions were received from various businesses and business groups, advisers, and their representative bodies.

A number of those submissions made the same points as have been made by the Working Group.  These submissions have been considered carefully, and officials have reported on them to government.  Legislation addressing these matters will appear in a tax bill which is intended to be introduced in June 2008.

1 Note that to avoid confusion, a distinction should be made between excluding all AAUs from the NZ ETS, excluding all imported AAUs, and excluding specific sources of imported AAUs, such as “hot air” AAUs or AAUs not covered under bilateral agreements.  For example, New Zealand participants in Projects to Reduce Emissions, Negotiated Greenhouse Agreements and the Permanent Forest Sinks Initiative may receive New Zealand AAUs, and the intention of the Bill is to permit those AAUs to be traded within the NZ ETS.  A further distinction should be made between blocking the surrender of imported AAUs for compliance purposes under the NZ ETS, and blocking the entry of such units into the New Zealand registry.  For example, allowing imported AAUs into the registry may be desirable for New Zealand-based carbon traders even if the units may not be used for compliance purposes under the NZ ETS.

2 ‘Further analysis of AAUs in the ETS’ was presented at the Climate Change Leadership Forum meeting of 4 December 2007 and is available in the shared workspace.

3 Conversely, traders that buy and hold, are liquidity drainers as such strategies do not result in significant turnover.

4 Delivery versus Payment - A securities industry procedure in which the buyer's payment for securities is due at the time of delivery. Security delivery and payment are simultaneous.